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Abstract
This article discusses how the Chinese government engages in online political debates and 
whether it adjusts its policies to respond to public concerns raised in such debates. This research 
explores government actions and discourses by using debates between Chinese net-users and 
the government around the building of an oil refinery in Kunming as a case study. It finds that 
the government used traditional party newspapers and social media as platforms to express its 
opinions and to interact with net-users regarding the oil refinery. The reports published in party 
media and government social media posts acknowledged the government’s awareness of the 
public’s concerns, demonstrated their reaction to the concerns and reinforced the government’s 
agenda. However, although the government engaged with the debate, it did not change its 
decisions about the oil refinery to respond to the public concerns raised online.
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Introduction
The actions of the Chinese government in relation to the use of the Internet by its citizens are 
important issues in the study of the digital media in China. Studies have drawn on the perspective 
of the government’s regulations and controls of the Internet and have questioned how the 
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government determines whether and how the Internet can be used by the Chinese public, which 
topics can be debated and what language can be used. Studies have also looked at the ways in 
which the government engages with, is influenced by and interacts with online public debates, 
questioning whether and how online debates have generated impacts and pressures on the govern-
ment, and whether or not the use of the Internet in China can enhance public–government com-
munication. Studies from these perspectives are enabling scholars to draw critical insights about 
Internet use in China in the digital era.
The Chinese government’s actions in relation to the Internet have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion, not only because those actions shape the development of the digital media in China, but also 
because the Chinese government’s actions are complex and unique, and thus offer important exam-
ples for the wider understanding of governmental behaviours in relation to digital media. In China, 
the government’s actions can be contradictory; while it promotes the digital media as a tool for 
economic growth, it fears losing control over online information flow and online political debates 
(King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; S. Li, 2010; Tai, 2014; Wu, 1996). The promotion of the Internet has 
led to more than half of the Chinese population becoming net-users (China Network and Information 
Centre [CNNIC], 2017), and has allowed a booming Internet culture that is diverse, dynamic, con-
tentious and political to develop (Yang, 2009). However, this political and contentious online cul-
ture contains serious criticism directed towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and even 
accommodates debates with strong democratic appeal that might demand the overthrow of the CCP 
regime (S. Li, 2010). These are the aspects the Chinese government fears, and thus, it constantly 
updates control and regulation of the Internet. Tai (2014, p. 185) describes censoring and control-
ling of the Internet as the ‘hallmark’ action of authoritarian regimes such as China. It is seen as a 
‘hallmark’ action because although the Chinese government has in recent years offered a certain 
level of freedom of speech for the media, including the Internet, still its fundamental attitude is to 
regulate and control to establish and maintain a favourable characterisation of the single-party 
regime in the media sphere. As a result, political control becomes the primary and major method: 
it frequently occurs in China, and is well explored in academic studies. But the presence of political 
control should not be taken as implying that the government has effectively controlled and cen-
sored all alternative voices. Rather, it should be seen as a form of struggle between the Chinese 
public’s constant demands for more and freer spaces for public political expression and the govern-
ment’s strong determination to maintain its control (Rosen, 2010). As a result of this struggle, the 
Chinese government is constantly updating its regulations and controls, while the public is con-
tinually finding ways around to express alternative opinions (Endeshaw, 2004). Thus, by studying 
regulations and controls, scholars are not only investigating how the Chinese government tries to 
shape and restrict the use of media, but are also more widely studying the constant struggle between 
the government and the public in China.
Political control, although important, is not the only action taken by the Chinese government in 
relation to online activities. In recent years, the Chinese government has started to understand the 
importance of online communication, and thus instead of implementing total control, it has begun 
to develop new ways to react to and manage it. These new ways include a number of aspects: a 
more relaxed attitude towards some challenging voices to ‘reduce social confrontation’ (Jiang, 
2008, pp. 11-12), the establishing of the government’s own online discourses to influence public 
opinions, engagement with existing debates to show its awareness of certain social and political 
problems, and communication with net-users to solve these issues for the purpose of ‘facilitat[ing] 
compliance with state policies’ (Jiang, 2008, pp. 11-12). In other words, the Chinese government 
is trying to enter into the online space and become part of the online-communication sphere as a 
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new way to establish and maintain a favourable voice for the regime. Compared to political control 
such actions are less analysed in current academic debates. But this lack of attention does not mean 
they are insignificant; they are important and indispensable aspects of an overall understanding of 
the wider issues. To study whether and how the Chinese government engages in online debate is to 
study a form of public–government interaction in China. This approach can assist academics in 
understanding the extent to which the public’s use of digital media can affect government decisions 
and actions, and can illuminate the Chinese government’s changing attitudes towards the digital 
media and the new strategies it has adopted. Such investigation and analysis can thus contribute to 
an updated understanding of the Internet in China. A few academic studies have, so far, discussed 
this perspective (e.g. Huang & Yip, 2012; Jia, 2012), but because government engagement and 
response happen only occasionally and are hard to predict, opportunities for empirical discussion 
are limited. The existing studies are meaningful examples, but are few in number and limited in 
extent, so further empirical data are needed to enrich current debates.
This research is conducted to contribute to and enrich the current academic debates around the 
Chinese government’s engagement in online debates. The article presents an analysis of the Chinese 
government’s actions in relation to an online debate in 2013 around the building of an oil refinery 
in the Anning area of Kunming in Yunnan province and its sub-products including paraxylene 
(PX). The proposal to build this refinery was originally submitted to the government in 2004, and 
was agreed by the government and gradually developed over the subsequent 9 years. Heated online 
debates about the development took place mainly between April and June 2013, when Kunming 
residents found out about the potential environmental damage linked to the refinery. To understand 
critically the government’s actions in this case, this article analyses the content and discourses in 
the reports and posts about the refinery published in three party newspapers and in the mayor of 
Kunming’s Sina Microblog account. It finds that the Chinese government paid attention to the 
online public debates around the oil refinery, understood its impacts and was willing to become 
involved in communication with the public. In this communication, the government demonstrated 
awareness of the public’s environmental concerns over the Kunming refinery and understood that 
these concerns were primarily expressed through online debates. However, rather than truly 
respecting public opinion, considering public needs, or at least finding a reasonable solution from 
which both the government and the public could benefit the government primarily reinforced its 
own interests and opinions in its communications, and purely attempted to persuade the public to 
follow the government agenda. In the end, the public’s concerns over this refinery remain unsolved, 
as the government has not changed its decision, carried on with the building of the refinery and has, 
moreover, prevented the public from accessing further information about the refinery.
This research is important for the current understanding of digital media in China, although it 
only presents one example of government–public interaction, rather than offering a wider review 
of the subject. As suggested, although the Chinese government’s engagement with online debates 
is expanding, it is still rare. Under such circumstances, every individual case is valuable and acts 
as a contribution to the development of a bigger picture of the issues. The Kunming refinery case 
presented in this article can contribute to our understanding of the Chinese government’s actions in 
three ways. First, the case informs us that, at the point that public anger reaches a peak level, the 
traditional actions of deleting online posts and forbidding online accounts from posting informa-
tion does not effectively reduce public anger, and may even trigger it. The government can venture 
beyond pure political control and become involved in communication with the public, and even in 
actual online debates. But this article does not want to suggest that the government will always 
engage with heated online debates when public anger is hard to control, and the Chinese 
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government’s actions in such situations are still hard to predict. There are no rules to be followed 
and so subjective decisions are made by the government at the time of an event. The Kunming case 
demonstrates one possibility, but not a definite outcome.
Second, the Kunming case offers a way to critically analyse the Chinese government’s actions 
in relation to online debates, and suggests that such engagement actions should not necessarily be 
equated with being responses to the issues raised in such debates: engagement demonstrates a level 
of involvement and interaction between two sides, while a response suggests a meeting of the pub-
lic’s needs and a solving of their concerns. By distinguishing between these two processes, it is 
possible to assess the impact of the online debates, by investigating to what extent the Chinese 
government’s attitudes and decisions have been influenced by online debates. The Kunming case 
in particular shows that the Chinese government’s engagement with a debate does not necessary 
lead to a response, and the action of engaging in online communication was instead used by the 
government to reinforce its own interests, rather than to truly understand the public’s needs or to 
discuss a reasonable solution.
Third, the Kunming case also demonstrates that the action of engaging in online debates does 
not mean that the Chinese government’s general attitude towards online debates has changed, as it 
is still the government’s core interests which are reinforced through its communications. In this 
particular case, such reinforcement is demonstrated by the ways that the national government’s 
interests are constructed as being unchallengeable while local government’s interests are presented 
as something that can be discussed. This is similar to the agenda that the Chinese government 
adopts when it controls, regulates and censors online debates: the legitimacy of the CCP regime 
cannot be questioned, while the struggles and conflicts between local government and the public 
may be discussed, with the intention of reducing public anger and facilitating compliance towards 
the central government.
The Chinese government’s actions in relation to online political 
debates
Political control and censorship
The most studied and debated government actions relating to the Internet in China are political 
control and censorship, and they define the scale of online political debates in China chiefly in 
terms of what can and cannot be said. The frequency and importance of such actions reflect the 
Chinese government’s definitions of the political status of the media. As Chan (2003, p. 159) 
states, the media is ‘regarded as an important part of the ideological apparatus’ for the Chinese 
government to use to promote party interests, stabilise its regime and control opinions in the public 
domain (see also Hassid, 2008; Wang & Ang, 2010). To establish and maintain such a political 
status for the media, political control and censorship are crucial government actions, used to ensure 
the media serves the party’s interests rather than being used against it. Through regulating, control-
ling and censoring, the Chinese government defines certain information as sensitive and harmful, 
and prevents its appearance in the public domain, thus discouraging and forbidding the public from 
engaging in debates containing such information.
For the Internet in particular, the Chinese government has established a regulatory framework 
that controls both the physical structure of the network and public access to it. It regulates and 
controls online service providers, including Internet business companies and website administra-
tors, to ensure that they always follow the government agenda, and it regulates and censors online 
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information to be favourable towards the government (Clayton, Murdoch, & Watson, 2007; 
Goldsmith & Wu, 2008; Harwit & Clark, 2001; O’Rourke, Harris, & Ogilvy, 2007). Service pro-
viders and website administrators are also regulated to be self-responsible for the information that 
is published and transferred via their networks. If a particular IP address or website is found to 
contain sensitive and harmful information, then the service provider that facilitates the IP or admin-
isters the website will need to take actions to assist the state monitoring body and censors. This 
responsibility has economic implications for the service provider, as if they fail to self-regulate and 
self-censor, their licences could be revoked, websites could be shut down or they could be subject 
to fines (S. Li, 2010). Individual users are also required to comply with national and website-level 
regulations regarding information and behaviours with which they are prohibited from engaging. 
If they publish opinions that are regarded by the monitoring bodies as sensitive, their opinions are 
removed, their access to particular websites can be blocked and their accounts on those websites 
can be closed down. Through the establishment of this regulatory framework, the views and infor-
mation people can express and their online access are regulated and restricted.
Relaxed approach and limited engagement
Political control and censorship set the context for online political debates in China. However, this 
does not mean that the government will censor every bit of information, leaving no space for politi-
cal communication through the Internet. Rather, McCormick and Liu (2003, p. 146) suggest that 
there is room for ‘uncertainty’: the government can be very strict in keeping information out of the 
public domain, but sometimes can relax its control and allow political debates around certain issues 
to exist in the public domain. It can even communicate with users rather than censoring every 
debate, although this approach is limited in extent. Zhang (2011, p. 104) argues that the Chinese 
government’s control and censorship is more relaxed if the information appearing in the media 
relates to ‘natural disasters and accidents’ that are intimately related to ordinary individuals’ lives, 
even if discussing those issues may involve ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiation and accommodation with 
the state’. But topics such as human rights, religions, protests, violent eruptions of frustration and 
ethnic problems … social issues and conflicts that are perceived to threaten the CCP’s legitimacy 
or the political system do not gain from such relaxed policies. (Zhang, 2011, p. 115) 
Tai (2014, p. 186) suggests that the government encourages ‘exposés of the misbehaviour of 
local officials’, but ‘tends to ban news that directly threatens the legitimacy of the regime’ (Tai, 
2014, p. 190). These findings demonstrate that, although the overall approach the Chinese govern-
ment takes towards political debates is controlling and censoring, it applies different strategies to 
particular issues. Issues that do not shake the fundamentals of the CCP regime, and those which 
help the national government to target local corruption, can remain in the public domain, to be 
‘managed’ and ‘guided’ (Tai, 2014, p. 190). By allowing such criticisms to be aired, the govern-
ment makes the public feel that some public opinions can be expressed, although only to an extent 
that is manageable by the national government. Although local government and certain behaviours 
of the national government are criticised, the legitimacy and the rightfulness of the CCP regime as 
a whole is still not questioned.
A few studies show that Chinese government takes this more relaxed approach a step further by 
occasionally engaging in debates to communicate with net-users and even to solve such users’ 
concerns. The types of debates that the government may engage in are very limited: it may occa-
sionally engage around local events that attract huge public attention and are linked to daily lives, 
including sudden accidents, but not with those that challenge the legitimacy of the CCP. Huang and 
Yip (2012), for example, studied anti-PX protests in Xiamen, showing that, because of countless 
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public opinions expressed online disagreeing with the Xiamen government’s decision to set up a 
PX factory, the Xiamen local government was pressured to ‘announce a suspension of the project’ 
(Huang & Yip, 2012, p. 210). This suggests the possibility that the government can react to online 
political debates of this kind, and even change its decisions to respect public opinion. A more sys-
tematic study of the government’s engagements is presented by Jia (2012). By using the 2011 7.23 
train accident as an example, Jia analysed related official and public discourses. He shows that, as 
online public debates around the accident grew, the government kept a close eye on the public 
opinions expressed, and engaged with the public to discuss the accident through traditional media, 
publishing official documents and staging meetings and conferences (Jia, 2012, p. 2). He also sug-
gests that official discourses were mostly constructed to report on, and provide updates about, the 
situation, to ensure the government’s ability to carry out rescue procedures, to explain its account-
ability and to praise social cooperation in the aftermath of the accident (Jia, 2012, p. 6). The limita-
tion of Jia’s study is that, although it provides a quantitative picture to categorise the government’s 
discourses and to demonstrate the interactions between it and net-users, it lacks critical reflection 
about these discourses. It demonstrates what the government did but does not discuss what the 
government’s actions meant in terms of the online political debates around the issue.
It should also be noted that although a more relaxed approach has been observed, the decisions 
made by the government about whether and how to control and censor certain information are still 
arrived at subjectively. The decision-making process is opaque, arbitrary and unpredictable. In 
other words, although in the Xiamen event and the 7.23 accident, government engagement and 
even responses were observed, it cannot be concluded that the government will always react in 
similar ways. The government has not established and does not follow a publicly accessible and 
clearly defined legal framework that demonstrates what information will be controlled and cen-
sored and what will be engaged with or responded to. Decisions are made purely according to the 
government’s needs and interests at the time, and the public is not given the power to request 
explanations or to fight against government decisions. Thus, although a more relaxed approach can 
be observed, this does not necessarily indicate an actual loosening of control.
However, it is still necessary to examine this relaxed approach and limited government engage-
ment as it has manifested in particular circumstances, not only because this helps to widen our 
understanding of the Chinese government’s behaviours towards online debates, but also because 
new questions are posed that need to be answered. Following a review of the literature, this article 
identifies three key questions and aims to answer them through empirical analysis. The first ques-
tion is whether it is possible for us to find another event in which the Chinese government has 
engaged with online debate, or are the Xiamen PX and 7.23 events just rare exceptions to the more 
characteristic hard-line approach? The second question is that in Xiamen PX case it was possible 
to observe the government’s engagement into online debates, and such engagements have led to 
solution of the concern, namely the plan to build the factory was suspended; then should we regard 
the Xiamen PX case as a one-off occurrence, or as a repeatable result that may be consistently 
observed in similar events? The final question addresses whose interests are actually reinforced in 
the process of engagement: the public or the government? Can we regard government engagement 
as something positive, or is the underlying situation just ‘business as usual’?
Selection of the case study
To answer these questions, the Kunming oil refinery debate has been selected as a case study. 
A case-study approach has been chosen because it is a specific way to examine government 
behaviours and enables this paper to critically analyse the government’s actions. The Kunming 
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case was a public debate around the building of an oil refinery, and the central contentions and 
concerns expressed between the public and the government related to the environmental impact 
of the refinery. The national government decided to build the oil refinery as a part of its national 
resource strategy, to address the country’s resource shortage and transportation problems (Chen, 
2010). The local government welcomed the refinery as a source of local economic growth 
through heavy industry. However, Kunming locals considered it to be environmentally damag-
ing, as discharges from the oil-refining and sub-production processes could pollute the local 
atmosphere and waterways. They thus disagreed with the government’s decision and asked for 
it to be scrapped. The primary platform for the public to express their concerns was Sina 
Microblog (the equivalent of Twitter in China). Following the online debate, both national and 
local government reacted to public concerns by using both party media and Sina Microblog, 
albeit to a limited extent.
The Kunming case is selected because previous studies show that government engagement is 
more likely to occur in debates around those local events which attract huge public attention and 
are intimately linked with citizens’ daily lives. Both the Xiamen case and the 7.23 accident fit this 
category, and the Kunming case is of a similar kind, but with unique aspects. Its significance lies 
in the nature of the issues and the fact that it not only generated huge public participation but also 
gained government recognition. The Kunming case is one among a stream of oppositions to PX 
production in China, although PX production is only one part of the Kunming refinery’s opera-
tions. This opposition to PX production began with the 2007 Xiamen protest (Huang & Yip, 2012), 
and many similar protests and debates occurred apart from the Xiamen and Kunming cases. The 
dispute over this particular issue displayed a visible level of sustainability, which took it beyond 
specific local cases to become a nationwide issue. Xiamen can be regarded as the starting point, 
with the Kunming case being a landmark in terms of isolated anti-PX protests developing over time 
into a potential movement and sustained debate around a particular issue. Such sustainability in 
environment-related political communication was regarded by Stalley and Yang in their 2006 study 
as non-existent in China (Stalley & Yang, 2006) at that time. However, the Kunming case, along-
side other emerging anti-PX debates and protests across China, has proved that sustainability does 
exist. The Kunming event is a landmark in this development, not only because it was huge at the 
time, but also because the Chinese government admitted its importance. China Environment Report 
(2017), the national official newspaper owned by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
named the Kunming case as 1 of the 10 landmark events of 2013. It is the only anti-PX event in 
this ranking of key events in China’s environment protection, and no other PX-related event has 
gained similar recognition.
The case is also unique because it is the first case in China that involves a city mayor’s engage-
ment via an official microblog account. The city’s mayor of Kunming was the first in China to open 
an official microblog account and its first use was to engage with individuals regarding the oil 
refinery. This engagement by the mayor is also significant because it took place on Sina Microblog, 
where the online debate around the issue first emerged and developed. In contrast with the govern-
ment’s engagement in previous cases, which mainly used traditional media, the use of social media 
in this case is worthy of analysis.
Methodology
To answer the research questions through the Kunming case, this research studied two party media 
formats: first, posts in the Kunming mayor’s microblog from May 2013 (when the account was 
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opened), to December 2013,1 and second, reports from three key party newspapers: Kunming Daily 
and Yunnan Daily (two local party newspapers) and The People’s Daily (the central party newspa-
per), for the period from January 2004 to December 2013. The reason for analysing the govern-
ment’s attitudes and actions through party media is that they are the mouthpieces of the CCP and 
reports from them reflect the needs and interests of the government.2 These differing representa-
tives of party media are selected because the use of a microblog was unique to the Kunming case, 
while the party newspapers are the major media outlets used to communicate the government’s 
views. The People’s Daily, Yunnan Daily and Kunming Daily, as three central party newspapers at 
the national, provincial and city levels, are studied to provide comprehensive coverage. The period 
between 2004 and 2013 was chosen because the proposal for the building of the Kunming refinery 
first came up in 2004, and then gradually developed over the following decade, gaining public 
attention in 2013. It is necessary to study reports over this period to understand whether there have 
been changes in the government’s attitudes over time, especially in the periods before and after the 
online public debates. This can help researcher s to understand whether or not heated online debate 
impacts on government behaviour.
The method applied in this research is a combination of content analysis and discourse analysis. 
This combination is chosen to enable investigation of the three research questions: whether Chinese 
government would engage with online debates in Kunming’s case; if so, does engagement has led 
to the resolution of public concerns of the environmental damage; and whose interests are actually 
reinforced in the process of engagement – the public or the government? To answer these ques-
tions, it is necessary to understand the government’s actions (and/or its changing approach to such 
actions) from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Quantitative data, such as numbers of 
reports and posts and the various themes covered, enables this research to analyse whether and to 
what extent the government paid attention to the Kunming events (measured through the amount 
of reporting), and the major focus and concerns of its attention (e.g. the economic benefits of the 
oil refinery or environmental protection). Through these data, this article can demonstrate to what 
extent the government paid attention to the oil refinery issue between 2004 and 2013 and whether 
more attention in terms of a visible increase of numbers of reports was given to the issues following 
the online debates which took place between April and June 2013. If such an increase is identified, 
this suggests that online debates did have an impact on the government’s behaviours, and pushed 
the government to face the public’s concerns, and become involved in communications.
In contrast, identification of the themes of reports can provide further evidence for the research 
questions by demonstrating whether or not there was a change in the focus of the reports. To clar-
ify, it can be suggested that the government regarded the refinery as economically beneficial and a 
part of its resource strategy, while the public believed that the refinery would be environmentally 
unfriendly and perceived the government’s decision to build the refinery as an ignoring of public 
needs. Given such assumptions, if the theme of a report is the economy and resources, this indi-
cates that it reinforces the government’s definition of the refinery, while if a report addresses the 
environment and public opinion, then the public’s view of the refinery is reinforced. Thus, by 
identifying the themes of reports, it is possible to identify whether the party media’s focus regard-
ing the refinery changed after the online debates appeared. If so, this could be further proof of the 
impact of the online debates on the government. To provide the quantitative data required, this 
research applied content analysis to identify and categorise the themes of reports. Four codes were 
applied to the various naming of the refinery in reports: China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), Yunnan oil-refining factory/plan, CNPC 10-million-tonne oil-refining factory/plan, 
China-Burma Oil/Gas pipeline, and these were then searched for in the titles of reports in the party 
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media. Then, associations with the codes were identified, to discover whether they were associated 
with environmental protection, resource strategies, economic issues, public/public opinion or 
Internet/net-users. These categories are established according to the characteristics of the online 
debates around the refinery issue, as mentioned above. These associations allow the article to cat-
egorise the reports into different themes.
Quantitative data answer the first research question, investigating whether online debates can 
impact the government’s behaviours and lead it to become involved, but it cannot provide a criti-
cal and detailed reflection of whether the public’s concerns have been engaged with and solved 
after the involvement, nor can it demonstrate whose interests are reinforced in the communica-
tion. To answer these questions, this research applies critical discourse analysis (CDA) to meas-
ure the qualitative date. CDA is used because it is a method that is primarily concerned with 
power relations in communications: who gains power in the construction of the discourse and 
through what means? As Gee (2014, pp. 7-8) argues, languages are structured by different groups 
with different interests and needs, and people are seeking to ‘gain’ or ‘give’ ‘social goods’ in or 
through their use of discourses; when certain groups are gaining in discourses, other groups 
could be ‘losing’ or ‘being denied’. In the Kunming case, there is a power struggle between the 
government and the public, as they have different needs and interests. In this struggle, the gov-
ernment is the powerful actor, and it defines the needs and interests around the refinery without 
enquiring into public opinions; the public is the less powerful actor, but it has the power to chal-
lenge the government by using the Internet. The process of communication can be seen as one of 
(re)defining whose interests and needs should be put first: whether it is the government’s strate-
gic needs for economic growth and resources or the public’s challenge which acquires the greater 
power. In this process, if one side gains, the other side may lose, but alternatively a win–win 
solution can be discussed in the communication. But regardless of the results of such processes, 
when the party newspapers were used by the government to communicate, the discourses used 
demonstrate the processes of the power struggle taking place. By critically analysing the con-
struction of words, phrases and sentences in the party media, this research asked what words are 
used by the party media to describe the refinery and online public debates; whose needs (the 
public’s or the government’s) are constructed through the discourses and in what ways; and who 
has the power to define what should be done about the refinery, about the public concerns over 
the refinery, and about the future of the refinery.
The Chinese government’s actions in the Kunming oil refinery 
case
The Kunming case illustrates the Chinese government’s actions in relation to online political 
debates. These range from censorship, to limited tolerance of oppositional voices, to engagement, 
but they do not go as far as actual responses. Censorship and limited tolerance are the first reactions 
to be observed. The heated online debates about the refinery took place between April and June 
2013, and the large numbers of posts, comments and retweets generated on various Sina Microblog 
accounts questioned and argued against the government’s decision, suggesting that its decision to 
launch the refinery harmed local people’s interests. Many of the posts, however, were immediately 
or eventually removed from the platform. Interestingly, not all posts were removed. For example, 
a microblog posting of an article entitled ‘Why Does Kunming Move in Reverse?’, which reported 
the potential environmental damage related to the refinery, remained uncensored, and was 
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commented on and retweeted a total 13,493 times. Public concerns are repeatedly expressed 
through these comments and retweets, showing the public’s disagreements with the government’s 
decision. The procedures and reasons for censoring most of the posts but being relaxed about some 
of them remains unclear for this case, since the government and the Sina Microblog regulatory 
body did not offer any explanations.
Methods, themes and discourses in the government’s engagements
The Chinese government also engaged in these debates to a limited extent. After concerns were 
raised, both the local and national governments joined the debates, mainly using the party newspa-
pers as platforms, but also involving other channels. Table 1 lists the different methods used by 
both local and national governments between April and June 2013, the period when online public 
debates were most heated.
Table 1 demonstrates that in the period of heated online political communications about the 
refinery, the government took multiple actions to communicate with the public about the oil refin-
ery in Kunming. Party newspapers were the most-used channels, and in the period between May 
and June 2013, reports relating to the refinery appeared in party newspapers almost on a daily 
basis. In addition to reporting through party media, the local government organised a range of other 
activities to engage with the public, including press conferences, discussion panels, public exhibi-
tions, talks and field visits. These events were then reported by the two local party newspapers.
Table 1 shows that party newspapers were the primary channels through which government 
attitudes and actions were reported. This reflects the function of the party newspapers as the most 
important outlets through which the government demonstrated its opinions around the refinery in 
reaction to the online debates. Figures 1 and 2 provide information supporting further analysis of 
the content of reports from these newspapers.
Figures 1 and 2 show that, in reporting on the Kunming refinery in May to June 2013, there 
were 70 reports in the three newspapers, while between 2004 and April 2013 and between July and 
December 2013, there were only 19. This reveals a considerable increase in government attention 
given to the refinery in the immediate aftermath of the heated online debate, followed by a sizable 
decrease 2 months later. When it comes to the themes of the reports in May and June 2013, the term 
‘public/public opinions’ appeared most frequently (29 times), followed by the term ‘environment/
environmental protection’ (27 times). However, in the time before and after this period, the themes 
Table 1. Responses from local and national public authorities to concerns about the Kunming oil refinery.
Local (Yunnan and Kunming) National
57 reports in Yunnan Daily and Kunming Daily 3 reports in The People’s Daily
Public exhibitions of oil-refining between 25 May and 10 June 2013 3 programmes on central television
5 public talks around oil-refining and PX production by specialists 
and officers
 
A trip to an oil refinery in Qinzhou (by selected public 
representatives)
 
1 press conference on 10 May 2013  
2 open discussion panels, on 13 and 21 May 2013  
The Kunming mayor’s microblog  
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‘resource strategy’ and ‘economy’ were mentioned most often (eight times each), while the envi-
ronmental aspect was only mentioned three times and public opinion and Internet/net-users were 
not mentioned at all.
It can be seen that before environmental concerns about the refinery were raised in online politi-
cal communications in April 2013, the coverage of the refinery was very limited in both extent and 
topic. The government only gave limited attention to issues relating to the refinery, and the econ-
omy and its resource strategies were the major focuses in the coverage that did appear, reflecting 
the government’s original objectives for the refinery. However, in 2013, when the government’s 
economics-driven objectives were questioned by net-users and environmental concerns about the 
refinery were clearly demonstrated through online debates, the coverage of the refinery increased 
Figure 1. Themes in reports about the Kunming oil refinery in the Kunming Daily, Yunnan Daily and The 
People’s Daily from May to June 2013.
Figure 2. Themes in reports about the Kunming oil refinery in The Kunming Daily, Yunnan Daily and The 
People’s Daily between January 2004 and April 2013 and from July to December 2013.
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dramatically in the party newspapers, and the focus of the party media changed, as they started to 
establish public opinion and the environment as the main themes of their reports. This is powerful 
evidence that online debates did influence the government, with the huge online debate pushing the 
government to pay considerably more attention to the public concerns around the Kunming oil 
refinery, to increase coverage of the issues in the party media and to focus reporting more on the 
public’s concerns about the refinery, namely the environment.
The Kunming mayor’s Sina Microblog is also evidence of engagement. It not only demonstrates 
government willingness to communicate about the public’s concerns as raised through online 
debates, but it also shows that local officials were attempting to engage with the public by using 
Sina, the primary platform used by Chinese net-users. Understanding this to be a key arena for 
communication, Kunming’s mayor opened a microblog account on 17 May 2013, becoming the 
first mayor in China to have an official microblog account. The purpose of his microblog was not 
only to communicate about the oil refinery, but also, as his first post suggests, ‘to listen to your 
opinions about Kunming’s development,’ and ‘to carefully study the advice and suggestions made 
by the crowd’. Public concern about the oil refinery was clearly the main factor behind his deci-
sion. The third post on his account started a discussion about the oil refinery and, in total, 11 of the 
mayor’s posts specifically focused on the refinery. Furthermore, a report published in the Kunming 
Daily on 18 May 2013 suggested that the oil refinery was the biggest concern in the microblog (Y. 
Li, 2013, p. A1). By using the microblog, the mayor shows his awareness of the importance of this 
online platform for communicating about the refinery and enters into the arena to engage in online 
discussions. By using this online platform, in which the mayor has the power to express his opin-
ions through microblogging but other users can also react to his posts through comments and 
retweets, other net-users have the opportunity to talk directly to government officials. The opinions 
of both the officials and the Internet users are equally visible in the same arena, enabling a more 
equal and inclusive interaction between the users and the government to be observed through the 
Internet. Indeed, the mayor’s 11 posts about the Kunming refinery generated a total of 14,752 
retweets and 20,855 comments.
Evidence of the government’s engagement in online debates can also be found in the contents 
of the reports, such as the following:
(Title) Kunming City Held a Press Conference with regards to the CNPC Yunnan Oil-Refining Plan 
Yesterday/The Oil-Refining Plan Insists on the Implementation of ‘One Vote Veto’ on Environmental 
Protection: The Whole Plan Does Not Have PX Device, Will Not Produce PX Products, Whether or Not 
Have Sub-Productions Will Follow Democratic Decision Procedures.
(First sentence) A few citizens and net-users have questioned whether the plan would impact on the 
environmental standards in Kunming. (Ma, 2013, p. 1)
This is an example text from Kunming Daily, published on 11 May 2013. This text is used as 
an example here because it was the first piece in any of the party newspapers to report on the oil 
refinery after the start of the heated online debates, and thus, it exemplifies the government’s 
fundamental attitudes at the time.
The discourses used in the title and first sentence are the focus here of CDA. It can be identified 
when constructing discourses that the key terms ‘environmental protection’ and ‘democratic deci-
sion procedures’ appear, indicating that when this party newspaper initially approached the issue of 
the oil-refinery during the time when the online debates were taking place, public concerns and 
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environmental protection, rather than the economy and resource strategy, were referenced. This 
suggests a gain for the public, in that the public’s needs and interests were reinforced while the 
government’s interests were invisible in the report. Furthermore, the title of the report uses the 
phrase ‘one vote veto’ on environmental protection’, meaning that if there were environmental 
problems, production would not be allowed to commence, thus reassuring the public that their 
concerns had been taken into consideration. The title also suggests that ‘democratic decision pro-
cedures’ would determine the sub-production of the refinery, helping to construct more power for 
the public, as if the power to make the decision is no longer held by the government, but by the 
public. The first sentence of the report then explains the reason for the government’s changing 
attitude, in other words, why the party newspaper was willing to construct more power for the 
public. It reports that the reason for this stance was that locals and net-users were questioning the 
environmental impact of the refinery. In other words, the power that pushed the government to 
construct the discourse in such a way was the online debates. Without the online debates the gov-
ernment would not have become involve in communication of this type, nor would it have allowed 
the public to gain more power in the discourses.
The various methods used to communicate and, particularly, the use of the microblog, changes in 
numbers of reports, the overall themes addressed, and the discourse of the reports indicate that the 
Chinese government can engage in online debates, even after it has tried to censor and subsequently 
become somewhat more relaxed about certain information, but could not reduce public anger and 
concerns. Engagement indeed has become a choice for the government, and the Xiamen PX and 7.23 
events are not exceptions to this approach. This also means that online debates in China can generate 
impacts on the government in ways that force it to recognise the existence of public needs which dif-
fer from its own, and may lead the government to begin negotiating with the public.
However, these actions cannot be equated with the government being willing to follow public 
opinion and give up the refinery. Although the government carried out multiple actions in relation 
to the public online debate, the function of those actions was to explain the government’s decisions 
and to defend and reinforce its own interests and needs to persuade individuals to accept the refin-
ery. The government did not invite individuals into a fully open conversation to seek the most 
reasonable solutions regarding the refinery; nor did it change its decision over the refinery in 
response to public concerns, although it had promised this in a newspaper article. Therefore, while 
the government’s actions can be regarded as an attempt to engage in political debates, it cannot be 
regarded as having fully responded to the public concerns raised online.
Limitations of the government’s actions
There are three indications of the limitations of the governments’ actions. The first is that the gov-
ernment’s core interests are maintained as unchallengeable in the various communications, and this 
can be particularly observed through the different association created between local and national 
government. It was the national government’s decision to launch the refinery, while the local gov-
ernment was only involved in making decisions about the refinery’s sub-production. In the online 
debate, members of the public were concerned about the potential environmental damage of the 
whole refinery, while the sub-production, and PX in particular, intensified their worries. If the 
government was truly engaging in the communications around the issue, understanding the con-
cerns of the public and allowing the public to make gains, then the decision to establish the refinery 
should have been re-considered. However, in the government’s discourses, the decision made by 
the local government to add sub-productions was regarded as the negotiable area, whereas the 
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national government’s decision to establish the oil refinery itself was regarded as unchallengeable, 
and as delivering only benefits. By separating these decisions in the communications, the legiti-
macy of the national government’s decision was protected, and, in consequence, the concerns 
raised over the environmental impact of the refinery were not fully addressed. The government, as 
a whole, still satisfied its own needs.
In the text already mentioned, this division is clear:
Kunming City Held a Press Conference with regards to the CNPC Yunnan Oil-Refining Plan Yesterday/
The Oil-Refining Plan Insists on the Implementation of ‘One Vote Veto’ on Environmental Protection: The 
Whole Plan Does Not Have PX Device, Will Not Produce PX Products, Whether or Not It Has Sub-
Productions Will Follow Democratic Decision Procedures.
In this text, PX/sub-productions appeared three times, while the oil refinery itself only once 
(excluding the name of the refinery). The oil refinery reference related only to the ‘“one vote veto” 
on environmental protection’, but not to the democratic decision. This means although the govern-
ment promised some sort of environmental protection measurement to be placed, still it did not 
allow the public to have the power to determine the establishment of the oil refinery. Also, when 
using the term ‘one vote veto’, the text does not demonstrate who the voter is; in fact, the voter is 
the government itself. This is because there is no public voting system in China, and without 
changing the political system, the public does not have the power to vote on any issues. This sen-
tence therefore actually means that the government could decide to close the refinery if it damages 
the environment, but regardless of how it decides, the power to make the decision is still held by 
the government alone. The public cannot have their say about any aspects in relations to the refin-
ery, which makes the national government’s decision to be unchallengeable. In contrast, the PX/
sub-production was constructed with totally different discourses. It was denied (‘does not have’, 
‘will not produce’) twice, and then, in allowing the public to determine whether to have PX pro-
duction at the plant, the power to decide has been clearly constructed for the public, through the 
term ‘democratic decision’.
Another example of this division between the refinery as a whole and its sub-production is the 
first report about the refinery after the online debates on 11 May 2013 published in Yunnan Daily:
(Title) Oil-Refining Project Will Benefit National Strategies and People’s Living Standards, Sub-
Production Items Will Respect Public Opinions.
The discourses in this text are constructed around two key terms: ‘oil-refining’ and ‘sub-
production’, and the words in the constructions are very different. The oil-refining project is 
described as benefitting ‘national strategies and people’s living standards,’ which is how the 
government defined this refinery in the first place. Through this definition, the government 
maintains its interests and needs. Also, when arranging the words, the term ‘national strategies’ 
is placed before ‘people’s living standards,’ giving a prior position to the former, as if people’s 
living standards, although important, are not as important as national strategies. This also stresses 
the requirements of the Chinese government from this refinery. In contrast, decisions about sub-
production are described as ‘respect[ing] public opinions’, which constructs power for the pub-
lic: the power to determine. By constructing the discourse differently around the two aspects of 
the refinery, the government tried to suggest that it had listened to the concerns expressed in the 
online debates and forced the local government to compromise. But the oil refinery would still 
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go ahead, as the national government’s decision is legitimate and unquestionable despite the 
online debates. It may appear on the surface that the government had respected public opinion 
and allowed the public to gain in terms of its interests, but in fact, by going ahead with the oil 
refinery, the government’s interests are protected while environmental concerns are not met.
The second indication of limited government actions is its choice to communicate about the 
refinery predominantly through one-direction/single channels, rather than by engaging in debate in 
an equal and inclusive arena. By using traditional party newspapers, public exhibitions and talks, 
information flowed from the authorities towards individuals, and no space was left for individuals 
to challenge them directly in an interactive platform. For the press conferences, the two discussion 
panels and the field trip to Qinzhou oil refinery, the government also took a dominant role. What 
questions could be asked, what answers could be reported, where and how to report them, and even 
which factories could be visited, were issues entirely determined by the government to fit with its 
interests. Questions and trips were designed to enable the government to justify its decisions rather 
than to equally and inclusively present both the government’s opinions and individuals’ concerns. 
By using these types of channels, the government was able to communicate its own view of the 
refinery, to reinforce its pre-existing interests and to promote its interests further, rather than open-
ing up a conversation in which diverse opinions could be equally and inclusively exchanged. The 
microblog was the only open, equal and inclusive arena used by governmental representatives, but 
it was a minor one in this process. Thus, although the government communicated to the public 
about the reasons behind its decisions and promised that certain actions would be taken to reduce 
environmental damage, the content of the communications was not produced through an equal and 
inclusive debate between the two sides. The pre-existing interests of the government were rein-
forced at the expense of public concerns.
The third limitation is that the government terminated communications about the refinery with-
out the public’s concerns being resolved. Communications about the refinery from the government 
ceased after June 2013, and there was a general lack of follow-up information about the construc-
tion of the refinery or the promised actions. It can be seen that although the concerns and conten-
tions regarding the oil refinery had not been resolved, the government was no longer willing to 
engage. This argument is based upon the observation of a dramatic decrease in the number of 
reports in the party newspapers and a decrease in posts in the Kunming mayor’s blog after June 
2013, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that in May 2013 the refinery was a central topic, as the number of reports 
referring to it reached a peak. However, after June 2013, there was a dramatic drop in the number 
of reports. In the Kunming Daily and Yunnan Daily, there were only 11 reports in total between 
July and December 2013, while 58 had been published in May and June. Kunming’s mayor did 
not post any further microblogs about the proposed refinery after June. In fact, May and June 
2013 was the only period during which information was provided in his microblog and when there 
was engagement about the refinery. In other words, while the party media offered a great amount 
of information regarding the refinery in that 2-month period, after this period, information became 
minimal and almost ceased. Yet this drop was not because the problem had been solved; public 
concerns over the refinery were not fully addressed and the construction of the refinery itself had 
not yet been completed.
Moreover, as previously analysed, the party media reported that the government would invite a 
democratic process to determine whether to go ahead with the sub-production (Hu, Sun, & Li, 2013; 
Ma, 2013). If the government had kept its promises, there would have been further information about 
the construction process, and about a public consultation process of some kind that could take 
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decisions regarding further developments at the refinery, especially about sub-production; however, 
none of these materialised. The dramatic drop in reports meant that very few further information was 
published about the construction of the refinery or about the sub-production; neither was there any 
sign of the promised democratic process. Thus, individuals had very little knowledge of what had 
been built, whether the refinery would produce PX, and even where they could access further infor-
mation about the refinery. It was not until August 2015 that the public were informed by a non-party 
newspaper that the refinery had been fined by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection because 
it had not put in place the environmental protection measures it had promised (South Urban Post, 
2015). However, the fine imposed was negligible and the refinery continued to operate without any 
measures being put in place. After 2 years, during which little information about the refinery was 
imparted and with no public monitoring in place, the refinery had still not installed the promised 
measures to reduce pollution, and the government had failed to supervise construction to ensure that 
those measures were in place; the ‘one vote veto’ had been an empty promise, which did not solve 
environmental concerns about the refinery. In this sense, the government’s engagement was limited 
because, although it engaged in communication, this engagement did not lead to changes; the govern-
ment’s interests were maintained and the public’s concerns were still neglected.
Discussion and conclusions
This research expands the current understanding of the Chinese government’s actions in relation to 
online political communication, showing that these were varied in nature and not limited to one 
type. But despite the variety of actions, the purposes of the government’s behaviours were still to 
maintain the political status of the digital media as a part of its ‘ideological apparatus’ (Chan, 2003, 
p. 159). This research has systematically examined the government’s engagement with online 
political communication around the oil refinery at Kunming, identifying that censorship was 
Figure 3. Number of articles about the Kunming oil refinery from January to December 2013, in Yunnan 
Daily, Kunming Daily and the Kunming mayor’s microblog.
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conducted to prevent online voices opposing the government’s decision from growing, this being 
the traditional practice of the government. However, the government also engaged in online 
debates, recognised public concerns expressed online, as it did in Xiamen and the 7.23 accident. 
This proves that engagement has become a possibility for the Chinese government, and should not 
be ignored in further studies. However, when critically examining the methods, contents and dis-
course used by the government in the political communication, it has been found that engagement 
by the government does not always lead to responses, and rather than aiming to facilitate equal and 
inclusive communications to understand public concerns and respond to them, the government 
uses such communications to reinforce and highlight its interests and needs and to keep its political 
agenda in the forefront of the public view. And even when, as in this case, the government prom-
ised actions, its promises were empty and the actions put forward were not delivered. This is dif-
ferent from the Xiamen case, and the reason for this is that the Xiamen case only involved local 
government decisions, while in Kunming, both local and national government decisions and inter-
ests were involved, and the national government’s decision dominated. These differences reflect 
the fundamental attitudes of Chinese government: the legitimacy of the national government can-
not be questioned, while local government decisions can, as long as there is no impact on the 
national government, and if resulting discussion can reduce social instability and help to facilitate 
compliance with the government as a whole.
This research also indicates that governmental behaviour in China is complicated, and rather 
than trying to draw generalised conclusions, specific and particular case-by-case examinations are 
more accurate and useful. Only through such examinations will it be possible to develop a more 
critically accurate understanding of the Chinese government’s actions in relation to online debates.
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